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Rumination is a characteristic feature of several clinical disorders (e.g., major depressive disorder, 
insomnia disorder). Emerging evidence suggests that a reduced flexibility in the balance between 
proactive and reactive control might be related to trait rumination. This study aimed to investigate the 
proactive-reactive control balance in the context of trait rumination. In the current study, we investigated 
behavioral performance and event-related potentials (ERPs) while participants were performing an AX- 
Continuous Performance Task, to evaluate whether a shift towards more reactive control (i.e., conflict 
monitoring and resolution) at the expense of proactive control (i.e., maintenance and updating of task-
relevant information) is associated with increased trait rumination. Our behavioral results as well as our 
ERP results did not demonstrate that a shift towards more reactive control at the expense of proactive 
control was associated with increased trait rumination. Future research is needed to investigate the 
proactive-reactive control balance in the context of trait rumination. This study is the first to explore the 
recruitment dynamics of cognitive control using behavioral as well as electrophysiological measures in 
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Introduction 
Rumination is a transdiagnostic feature that is characteristic of several mental disorders, such as 
major depressive disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder and insomnia disorder (Harvey, Watkins, 
Mansell, & Shafran, 2004). Rumination is defined as repetitive, uncontrollable thinking concerning 
negative past events and/or the focus on the causes, consequences and meaning of negative mood 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Rumination has negative affective consequences on 
mental wellbeing. For example, longitudinal studies have consistently shown that trait rumination (i.e., 
a higher tendency to ruminate) predicts new onsets of depressive symptomatology in initially non-
depressed individuals (for a review see, Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Moreover, numerous studies 
have demonstrated that trait rumination is also related to the severity of depressive episodes and to 
recovery from depression (for a review see, Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).  
However, it remains unclear why some individuals seem to develop persistent rumination, whereas 
others succeed in disengaging from these negative thoughts. The exact cognitive mechanisms underlying 
rumination are still poorly understood. Although the negative content of rumination plays a considerable 
role in its maintenance (i.e., activation of negative mood-congruent contents in working memory (WM) 
by a negative event or mood will amplify and maintain persistent rumination; Siemer, 2005), there is 
converging evidence that impairments in cognitive control might be related to the tendency to ruminate 
(e.g., Joormann, 2010; Joormann & D’Avanzato, 2010; Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 
2011; Watkins, 2008). Cognitive control refers to a variety of cognitive processes, such as selective 
attention, context updating and response inhibition. Together, these processes coordinate our thoughts 
and behavior in accordance with our internal goals (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; 
Miller & Cohen, 2001). Cognitive control is exerted whenever people have to focus on a task. We 
achieve this, for instance, by actively maintaining task-relevant information in WM, by preventing task-
irrelevant information to enter WM and by disengaging from information in WM that is no longer 
relevant for the task at hand (Botvinick, et al., 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Miyake, Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wager, 2000).  
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Watkins’s Elaborated Control theory (Watkins, 2008) proposes that impairments in cognitive control 
will result in difficulties in effectively regulating current thoughts in response to situational demands. 
This, in turn, will allow repetitive off-task thoughts (such as rumination) to occur and will result in poor 
performance on the task at hand. Within the same vein, the Impaired Disengagement Hypothesis (Koster 
et al., 2011) postulates that difficulties in exerting cognitive control, more precisely difficulties in 
disengaging attention from negative thoughts, put individuals at risk for experiencing persistent 
rumination. Some evidence in support of this proposed causal relationship has been recently provided 
by studies aimed at enhancing cognitive control in healthy individuals using a training paradigm (e.g., 
Cohen, Mor, & Henik, 2015; Hoorelbeke, Koster, Demeyer, Loeys, & Vanderhasselt, 2016). In these 
studies, participants showed a reduction in reported rumination levels after cognitive control training. 
These findings demonstrate that cognitive control is an important mechanism in driving rumination. 
Several cross-sectional (e.g., Beckwé, Deroost, Koster, De Lissnyder, & De Raedt, 2014; Davis & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008) as well as prospective studies (e.g., Demeyer, De 
Lissnyder, Koster, & De Raedt, 2012; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011) in dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
individuals and in individuals with major depressive disorder also show that impairments in cognitive 
control are associated with a higher tendency to ruminate (for reviews see Whitmer, Gotlib, & 2013; 
Yang, Cao, Shields, Teng, & Liu, 2017; Zetsche, Bürkner, & Schulze, 2018). Specifically, deficits in 
switching between internal representations in WM (e.g., Beckwé et al., 2014), in inhibiting previously 
relevant information (e.g., Whitmer & Banich, 2007) and in updating information in WM (e.g., 
Joormann & Gotlib, 2008) have all been related to trait rumination in dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
individuals as well as in individuals with major depressive disorder, after controlling for depressive 
tendencies. However, other studies have failed to find clear associations between impairments in 
cognitive control performance and rumination in similar samples (e.g., Alderman et al., 2015; Colzato, 
Steenbergen, & Hommel, 2018), or have even found enhanced cognitive control abilities to be associated 
with a higher tendency to ruminate (e.g., Altamirano, Miyake, & Whitmer, 2010; Zetsche & Joormann, 
2011). For instance, Altamirano and colleagues (2010) observed that an enhanced ability to ignore the 
irrelevant dimensions of a stimulus was related to higher levels of trait rumination in dysphoric and non-
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dysphoric individuals. Thus, the pattern of associations between cognitive control and trait rumination 
remains unclear.  
However, what none of these previous studies take into account is that cognitive control can operate 
on different time scales, ranging from very transient to sustained across longer periods of time (Aben, 
Calderon, Van der Cruyssen, Picksak, Van den Bussche, & Verguts, 2019). The Dual Mechanisms of 
Cognitive Control theory (DMC; Braver, 2012) offers a valuable framework for this temporal 
recruitment of cognitive control. This account proposes that cognitive control consists of two 
qualitatively distinct modes, where cognitive control is recruited either transiently or in a sustained way. 
According to the DMC theory, the ability to actively maintain goal-relevant information in a top-down 
manner reflects proactive control engagement. This sustained representation of information allows for 
optimal response preparation and acts in an anticipatory way to prevent conflict before it occurs. By 
contrast, reactive control reflects transient bottom-up goal reactivation, where cognitive control is 
mobilized just-in-time to detect and to resolve conflict after its onset. Although both control modes 
activate the same fronto-parietal brain regions, they operate on different time scales (Aben et al., 2019). 
Proactive control is associated with early and sustained activation in fronto-parietal areas, whereas 
reactive control is associated with a late and transient activation in these same regions (Aben, Calderon, 
Van den Bussche, & Verguts, 2020). The DMC account presumes that both control modes have 
complementary costs and benefits and that successful cognition depends on the successful 
implementation of both (Braver, 2012). According to the DMC framework, subtle changes in situational 
factors (e.g., predictive value of the context information, duration of the maintenance interval, 
expectation of interference) will produce a change in the individual’s use of a certain cognitive control 
strategy (Braver, Gray & Burgess, 2007). An efficient use of cognitive control hence involves the ability 
to flexibly switch between control modes when needed, based on the task context, to guarantee optimal 
task performance. A disturbed balance in the recruitment of proactive and reactive control might result 
in the reliance on a control mode that is in fact not the optimal mode in a given context, leading to 
impairments in task performance.  
 
 6
A few studies have already linked deficient proactive control to trait rumination. Beckwé and 
colleagues (2014) used an internal shift task where dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals had to keep 
a mental count of the number of nouns versus personality traits. Participants were asked to mentally 
update the respective category as fast as possible. Subsequently, an internal switching cost, reflecting 
reduced switching abilities, was calculated by subtracting the non-switch sequences (i.e., participants 
had to update the same category twice in a row) from the switch sequences (i.e., participants had to 
switch from one category to the other). The results revealed that a higher internal switching cost was 
associated with higher levels of trait rumination, after controlling for depression. Similarly, difficulties 
in disengaging from no-longer relevant information while updating the content of WM has also been 
associated with trait rumination in individuals with major depressive disorder, after controlling for levels 
of depression (e.g., Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Yoon, Lemoult, & Joormann, 2014; Zetsche, D’Avanzato, 
& Joormann, 2012). In addition, a recent meta-analysis also indicates that difficulties in discarding no 
longer relevant material from WM is related to trait rumination, even after controlling for levels of 
psychopathology (for a review, see Zetsche et al., 2018). These cognitive processes of monitoring and 
updating WM content by replacing no-longer-relevant information with new, more relevant information 
contributes to optimal proactive control engagement: when proactive control is engaged, context 
information should be properly represented, maintained and also updated in case this information is no 
longer relevant for the present context (Braver & Cohen, 2000; 2001; Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 
2009).  
In contrast, some studies in dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals have linked enhanced reactive 
control to increased levels of trait rumination (Altamirano et al., 2010; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011). 
Zetsche and Joormann (2011), for example, used an emotional flanker task where participants had to 
indicate the valence of a target word which was flanked by three distractor words. In the incongruent 
condition, the valence of the distractor words conflicted with the valence of the target word (e.g., 
negative distractors surrounding a positive target word). In the neutral condition, the valence of the 
distractor words was neutral compared to the valence of the target word (e.g., neutral distractors 
surrounding a positive target word). They found that being able to ignore negative information (i.e., 
negative distractor words) better compared to neutral information (i.e., neutral distractor words) 
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predicted increased levels of trait rumination, after controlling for depressive symptomatology. In line 
with this study, participants performed a Stroop task, where they had to name the ink color of a presented 
word while ignoring the meaning of the word itself. Participants had to respond to congruent (i.e., ink 
color matches meaning of color word) and incongruent trials (i.e., ink color does not match meaning of 
color word). They observed that accuracy on incongruent trials (requiring increased reactive control) 
was positively correlated with trait rumination, after controlling for levels of depression (Altamirano et 
al., 2010). However, other studies did not observe a relationship between increased reactive control (as 
reflected in performance enhancements) and increased levels of trait rumination in dysphoric and non-
dysphoric individuals as well as in individuals with major depressive disorder (Alderman et al., 2015; 
Colzato et al., 2018). For example, Colzato et al. (2018) found that in dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
individuals, the size of the Stroop effect, suggesting increased reactive control, was positively related to 
the tendency to ruminate. However, controlling for levels of depression eliminated this significant 
relationship between increased reactive control and trait rumination. Still, contrary to the more 
unequivocal findings related to proactive control, it remains unclear whether enhanced reactive control 
is indeed related to trait rumination when controlling for levels of depression.  
Taken together, the DMC proposes that healthy cognition relies on the flexible balance in the 
deployment of both cognitive control modes (Braver, 2012).  The abovementioned findings suggest that 
a decreased proactive control, potentially accompanied by a shift towards more reactive control, might 
be related to trait rumination. Interestingly, the DMC framework proposes that affect-related traits can 
impact which cognitive control mode is primarily used (Braver, 2012). Based on the DMC perspective, 
the shift towards reactive control observed in several populations (e.g., in older adults, see for example 
Braver et al., 2009) might actually represent a compensatory recruitment to account for a reduced or 
deficient proactive control engagement. Specifically, the expected relationship between trait rumination 
and reactive control might reflect such a tradeoff between proactive and reactive control: when the 
capacity to actively maintain task goals in working memory is reduced, one will switch to another, less 
resource demanding, control strategy to optimize and preserve behavioral performance as much as 
possible.  
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To date, all studies have investigated these two control modes in isolation, prohibiting the 
opportunity to study the relationship between the actual proactive-reactive control balance, as stressed 
by the DMC account, and rumination. No study has concurrently investigated both cognitive control 
modes using a single paradigm in the context of rumination. Therefore, in the current paper we propose 
to investigate how the balance between reactive and proactive control behaves in the context of 
rumination and whether a disturbance in this balance is associated with trait rumination. To this end, we 
will examine behavioral performance on a modified version of the AX - Continuous Performance Task 
(AX-CPT; Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, Bransome, & Beck, 1956; Servan-Schreiber, Cohen, &  Steingard, 
1996). This task has already been used extensively to assess the balance between reactive and proactive 
control (see for example Braver & Barch, 2002; Braver et al., 2009; Braver, 2012). It will allow us to 
measure participants’ reliance on both control modes by assessing 1) their ability to maintain and update 
contextual cue information in order to facilitate or suppress responses to a subsequent probe stimulus 
(i.e., proactive control) and 2) their ability to suppress an incorrect prepotent response tendency caused 
by contextual cue information (i.e., reactive control). Healthy young individuals are expected to 
primarily adopt a proactive control mode when performing the AX-CPT (Braver et al., 2009; Edwards, 
Barch, & Braver, 2010; Paxton, Barch, Racine, & Braver, 2008). Based on previous studies discussed 
above, we hypothesize that a disturbed proactive-reactive control balance might be related to trait 
rumination. Specifically, we predict that a shift from proactive control towards more reactive control is 
associated with increased trait rumination. Importantly, the relationship between cognitive control and 
rumination has mainly been investigated in relation to depression. Investigating the association between 
cognitive control and trait rumination in a sample of individuals without depressive symptoms will allow 
us to study the singular effect of cognitive control on trait rumination, without the interference of a 
depressive symptomatology.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Materials and Methods 
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Participants 
Ninety undergraduate students participated in this experiment. Seven participants were excluded 
from the analysis because of data corruption due to a software failure in the middle of the experiment. 
We controlled for depressive symptomology, based on the available cut-offs of the Beck Depression 
Inventory-II Dutch (BDI-II-NL) (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Van der Does, 2002) by excluding 
dysphoric participants with BDI-II-NL scores ≥ 14 (for a similar approach, see also e.g., De Lissnyder, 
Koster, Goubert, Onraedt, Vanderhasselt, & De Raedt, 2012). Participants were naive to the purpose of 
the experiment. A general report describing the aims and the group-level results of the study was sent 
to the participants after completion of the study. Written informed consent was obtained from each 
participant after the experimental task had been explained and prior to the experimental session. 
Undergraduate students received course credits for their participation. The study protocol was approved 
by the ethical board of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussel, Belgium (reference 2014/234).  
 
Self-report questionnaires 
The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS-NL-EXT; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003; 
Raes, Schoofs, Hoes, Hermans, Van Den Eede, & Franck, 2009) was used to measure the tendency to 
ruminate as a reaction to feelings of sadness or depression. The RRS-NL-EXT consists of 26 items and 
each item is rated on a 4-point scale (‘almost never’ to ‘almost always’). The RRS-NL-EXT exhibits 
adequate psychometric properties (Schoofs, Hermans, & Raes, 2010).   
The Beck Depression Inventory-II Dutch Version (BDI-II-NL; Beck et al., 1996; Van der Does, 2002) 
was used to measure depressive symptomatology. The BDI-II-NL is a 21-item inventory measuring 
depressive symptoms during the two weeks prior to participation. The BDI-II-NL has proven to have 
good psychometric properties (Van der Does, 2002). 
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Experimental task: AX-CPT  
Participants were seated in a quiet, dimly lit room for the duration of the experimental session. The 
AX-CPT was performed on a 17-inch color LCD monitor connected to a computer running a Windows 
operating system. Stimulus delivery and the recording of behavioral data (reaction time and accuracy) 
were controlled by E-prime (www.pstnet.com; Psychology Software Tools). In the AX-CPT, 
performance depends on the ability to maintain and update contextual (cue) information in order to 
facilitate or suppress responses to a subsequent target (probe) stimulus. Participants are presented with 
a sequence of letters (cue-probe pairs) and are required to make a target response when an A-cue is 
followed by an X-probe (i.e., AX-trials) and to respond with a non-target response for all other cue-
probe pairs (i.e., AY-trials, BX-trials, BY-trials). Unknown to the participants, target trials (i.e., AX-
trials) occur with a high frequency, inducing the preparation of a target response whenever an A-cue is 
presented. Consequently, increased use of proactive control (i.e., maintenance of the task-relevant cue 
information to prepare a response in advance) will result in a stronger bias for a target response whenever 
an A-cue is encountered. In AY-trials, where the initial preparation of a target response based on the cue 
needs to be suppressed in order to make the correct (i.e., non-target) response, increased use of proactive 
control will lead to decreased performance. However, whenever a B-cue is encountered and is used 
proactively (i.e., facilitating the preparation of a non-target response), performance on BX-trials will be 
enhanced. Conversely, increased use of reactive control reflects the use of task-relevant information 
only when it is required (e.g., after conflict is encountered). Thus, in the current task, reactive control 
involves reactivating the cue information after the probe has been presented. Increased use of reactive 
control should thus result in poorer performance on BX-trials, since X-probes will strongly bias 
responses towards an incorrect target response which will have to be overcome by reactivating the non-
target response of the B-cue. However, on AY-trials increased reactive control will enhance 
performance since the Y-probe will prompt for a correct non-target response, without being hindered by 
the A-cue. In summary, the AX-CPT creates task situations where either the one or the other control 
strategy is detrimental for task performance, allowing us to measure participants’ reliance on both 
proactive and reactive control.   
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Participants were instructed to respond by pressing one of two color keys on an AZERTY-keyboard. 
Participants had to respond by pressing the green key with their left index finger when an A-cue was 
followed by an X-probe (i.e., target response). For all other cue-probe combinations participants had to 
respond by pressing the red key with their right index finger (i.e., non-target response). Participants were 
asked to respond as fast and as accurately as possible, but speed was emphasized. All stimuli (in 30-
point Courier New bold font) were presented in white on a black screen. Target trials (i.e., AX-trials) 
constituted 70 % of the trials. Non-target trials (i.e., AY-trials, BX-trials, BY-trials) constituted 10 % of 
the trials each. A total of 400 experimental trials were administered and equally divided over four blocks 
(i.e. 100 trials per block). Each block included 70 target trials and 10 of each of the non-target trials 
types in a random order. After each block, the participants were allowed to take a short break. The 
experiment started with 10 practice trials, where the trial distribution followed the same percentages as 
in the experimental blocks (i.e., 70 % target trials, and 10 % for each type of non-target trials). After 
each practice trial participants received feedback on the accuracy of their responses (i.e., the message 
“correct” or “incorrect”). This feedback was omitted during the subsequent experimental blocks. Each 
experimental trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 1000 ms. Subsequently, a cue letter 
was presented for 500 ms again followed by a fixation cross for 2000 ms. Then, a probe letter was 
presented for 500 ms followed by a blank screen which was presented until the participant made a 
response. The inter-trial interval (ITI) randomly varied from 1000 ms to 1500 ms. Figure 1 depicts the 





Figure 1. Examples of the different trial sequences.  
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Data Analysis 
All statistical analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS 25 (International Business Machines, 
Armonk, NY, USA). We performed two repeated measures ANCOVAs with Trial Type (4 levels: AX, 
AY, BX, BY) as a within-subjects factor and the centered Rumination scores as a covariate on the 
dependent variables (i.e., median RTs of the correct responses and mean error rates). The covariate was 
mean centered prior to running the ANCOVA, since adding a covariate to a repeated measures analysis 
has been shown to bias the main effects of the within-subject factors (for an explanation of the procedure 
see Delaney & Maxwell, 1981). When the assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated in the 
analyses, we reported the corrected values for degrees of freedom, t-values and p-values. A Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied to the p-values (pGG) when the assumption of sphericity was violated. 
We used the Bonferroni-corrected α-level (.05/number of comparisons) in order to determine 




Based on previous studies discussed above, we hypothesize that a disturbed proactive-reactive 
control balance might be related to trait rumination. Specifically, we predict a shift from proactive 
control towards more reactive control. The DMC theory predicts that such a shift towards reactive 
control relative to proactive control will be associated with enhanced performance on AY-trials: 
participants will prepare a correct non-target response after a Y-probe, without being hindered as much 
by the A-cue (i.e., a decreased maintenance of the A-cue will decrease the tendency to prepare an 
erroneous target response). As such, we expect that if a shift towards more reactive control at the expense 
of proactive control is associated with increased trait rumination, we would expect this to be associated 
with improved performance on AY-trials (i.e., decreased error rates and faster reaction times) 
(Hypothesis 1.1). Similarly, according to the DMC account, a shift towards reactive control relative to 
proactive control will also be associated with worse performance on BX-trials. The decreased use of 
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proactive control will hamper participants in preparing an early non-target response following a B-cue. 
This failure to maintain the B-cue will subsequently bias them to making an incorrect target response to 
the X-probe. Thus, if a shift towards more reactive control instead of proactive control is associated with 
increased trait rumination, we expect worse performance on BX-trials (i.e., increased error rates and 
slower reaction times) (Hypothesis 1.2). To summarize, our primary outcome is performance (i.e., 
median RTs of the correct responses and mean error rates) on both AY-trials and BX-trials. We expect 
a shift from proactive control engagement to reactive control engagement (i.e., improved performance 




We excluded 16 participants based on a BDI-II-NL score within the clinical range. Additionally, two 
participants responded significantly slower (+2 SDs) than the mean and four participants made 
significantly more errors (+2 SDs) than the mean and were therefore excluded from the analysis. Thus, 
the final sample consisted of 61 participants (13 men)1. Their mean age was 18.8 years (SD = 1.23, age 
range 17 - 22 years). The mean BDI-II-NL score was 6.26 (SD = 3.57, range 0 - 13) and the mean RRS-
NL-EXT score was 48.77 (SD = 12.22, range 28 - 74). 
 
Behavioral results 
The median RTs of correct responses and mean error rates as a function of Trial Type (i.e., AX, AY, 
BX, BY) are summarized in Figure 2.
 
 




Figure 2. Means of the median reaction times (in ms) of the correct responses and the mean error rates (in %) as a function of Trial Type (i.e., AX, AY, BX, 





Inaccurate responses (i.e., target trials categorized as non-target trials or vice versa; on average 3.07 
%) were discarded for the RT analyses. A repeated measures ANCOVA with Trial Type (4 levels: AX, 
AY, BX, BY) as a within-subjects factor and the centered Rumination scores as a covariate on median 
RTs of the correct responses showed a main effect of Trial Type, F(3, 57) = 221.01, pGG < .001, η2p = 
.79). Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-tests indicated that participants were slower on 
AY-trials (MAY = 506 ms) compared to AX-trials (MAX = 392 ms, t(60) = 13.97, p < .001), BX-trials 
(MBX = 291 ms, t(60) = 16.80, p < .001) and BY-trials (MBY = 290 ms, t(60) = 18.61, p < .001). Post-
hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-tests indicated that participants were slower on AX-trials 
compared to BX-trials, t(60) = 9.76, p < .001 and compared to BY-trials, t(60) = 10.65, p < .001). 
Moreover, post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-tests did not indicate a difference in RTs 
between BX-trials and BY-trials, t(60) = 0.28, p = .79. The ANCOVA also showed a main effect of 
Rumination, F(1, 59) = 5.01, p = .029, η2p = .078: the slower participants responded on all types of trials, 
the higher their reported levels of trait rumination were. Finally, the ANCOVA did not show an 
interaction between Trial Type and Rumination, F(3, 57) = 1.98, pGG = .15, η2p = .032 (Hypotheses 1.1 
and 1.2).  
 
Error rates 
The same repeated measures analysis conducted on the mean error rates showed a main effect of 
Trial Type, F(3, 57) = 161.89, pGG < .001, η2p = .73). Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-
tests indicated that participants made more errors on AY-trials (MAY = 19.02 %) compared to AX-trials 
(MAX = 1.07 %, t(60) = 13.40, p < .001), BX-trials (MBX = 2.05 %, t(60) = 12.02, p < .001) and BY-trials 
(MBY = 0.46 %, t(60) = 13.55, p < .001). Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-tests indicated 
that participants also made significantly more errors on BX-trials compared to AX-trials, t(60) = 2.96, 
p < .001 and BY-trials, t(60) = 4.74 p < .001. Finally, post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-
tests indicated that participants made significantly more errors on AX-trials compared to BY-trials, t(60) 
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= 3.52, p < .001). The ANCOVA did not show a main effect of Rumination, F(1, 59) = 0.92, p = .34, 
η2p = .015, nor an interaction between Trial Type and Rumination (Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2), F(3, 57) = 
0.97, pGG = .34, η2p = .016. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Unexpectedly, we did not observe any shift in the balance of proactive and reactive control related 
to trait rumination in Experiment 1. Specifically, no performance impairments or enhancements on 
specific types of trials, were associated with increased trait rumination (Hypothesis 1.1 and Hypothesis 
1.2). This failure to find a clear association between rumination and shifts in the balance of these 
different control modes might be due to the fact that it has proven to be difficult to objectively measure 
reactive and proactive control engagement when solely relying on behavioral measures (e.g., 
Krompinger & Simons, 2011; Muscarella, Mairesse, Hughes, Neu, & Van den Bussche, 2019). It 
therefore seems crucial to turn to more sensitive measures to assess the reactive-proactive control 
balance. For example, Krompinger and Simons (2011) asked a sample of participants with low or high 
depression scores to perform a Stroop task while measuring their N450. The frontal N450 component 
(peaking around 450 ms after stimulus presentation), will show more negative activation following 
incongruent trials than following congruent trials and is related to conflict detection (West & Alain, 
2000), and thus to reactive control in the context of Stroop tasks. The N450 likely represents activity in 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Hanslmayr, Pastötter, Bäuml, Gruber, Wimber, & Klimesch, 2008; 
Liotti, Woldorff, Perez, & Mayberg, 2000). Although the behavioral Stroop effect (i.e., faster reaction 
times in response to congruent trials compared to incongruent trials) was not related to trait rumination, 
they did observe that the magnitude of the N450 Stroop effect (i.e., larger N450 for incongruent 
compared to congruent trials), was positively related to trait rumination, but only in individuals with 
high depression scores. This study implies that hyperactivation of task-related brain areas might be 
necessary to perform cognitive control tasks at normative levels (leading to preserved behavioral 
performance) in individuals who are prone to ruminate. Based on this, the lack of a behavioral 
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association between a shifted cognitive control balance and trait rumination in Experiment 1 might be 
due to compensatory brain activity in ruminators.  
In a second experiment, we therefore additionally used electroencephalography (EEG) to study the 
temporal recruitment of proactive and reactive cognitive control and its relationship to trait rumination. 
Due to its superior temporal resolution, EEG will allow us to precisely measure participants’ reliance 
on both cognitive control modes. Previous event-related potential (ERP) studies using the AX-CPT have 
reliably identified ERPs that are modulated by the recruitment of proactive and reactive control (e.g., 
Morales, Yudes, Gómez-Ariza, & Bajo, 2015; Muscarella, et al., 2019; van Wouwe, et al., 2011).  
Proactive control can be studied by means of the P3b and contingent negative variation (CNV) ERP 
components, measured during the cue-probe interval. The centro-parietal P3b component (peaking 
around 300-600 ms after cue presentation) is thought to reflect target categorization, context updating 
and maintenance of task-relevant information (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Polich, 2007; Polich & 
Comerchero, 2003). Moreover, the P3b amplitude increases with the presentation of novel task-relevant 
information (Knight, 1984). Previous studies have already observed larger P3b amplitude for B-cues 
compared to A-cues, given that B-cues are presented with a lower frequency than A-cues and thus reflect 
a higher novelty (Morales et al., 2015; Muscarella, et al., 2019). Subsequently, the CNV, a slow cortical 
potential that announces the preparation of a motor response emerges (Walter, Cooper, Aldridge, 
Mccallum, & Winter, 1964). The CNV appears after a warning stimulus (e.g., a cue) and announces the 
preparation of a motor action to a subsequent stimulus (e.g., a probe). Larger CNV amplitudes are 
expected whenever a response is proactively prepared (e.g., van Wouwe et al., 2011). Previous studies 
have observed larger CNV amplitudes in response to B-cues as compared to A-cues, given that B-cues 
accurately predict which response to make (100 % probability for a non-target response) compared to 
A-cues (e.g., 87.5 % probability for a target response). This cue-dependent modulation of the P3b and 
the CNV component respectively reflects that context-relevant novel information has been appropriately 
updated and maintained and that adequate response preparation processes are operative, again reflecting 
increased proactive control (e.g., Muscarella et al., 2019). Reactive control can be indexed by several 
ERP components following the presentation of the probe. A fronto-central N2 component (peaking 
around 200-300 ms after probe presentation), correlates with the activation of the anterior cingulate 
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cortex (ACC), a structure that is associated with response conflict detection (i.e., detection of a response 
conflict as triggered by the processing of irrelevant stimulus information) (Van Veen & Carter, 2002). 
Following the N2, a later P3a component occurs around 300-600 ms post-probe, indexing stimulus 
evaluation (Coles, Gratton, Bashore, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1985; Polich 2007; Purmann, Badde, Luna-
Rodriguez, & Wendt, 2011) and response inhibition (Nee, Wager, & Jonides, 2007; Smith, Johnstone, 
& Barry, 2008; Schupp, Lutzenberger, Rau, & Birbaumer, 1994). The evaluative P3a is associated with 
attentional processes needed to overcome robust response tendencies (for a review, see Polich, 2007). 
Previous studies observed larger N2 and P3a amplitudes following AY-trials compared with the other 
types of trials (Beste, Domschke, Radenz, Falkenstein, & Konrad, 2011; Morales et al., 2015; 
Muscarella et al., 2019). Participants will prepare a target response after presentation of the A-cue, which 
will conflict with the subsequent Y-probe information. Consequently, participants will detect response 
conflict (since cue and probe activate different response categories) and will have to resolve this 
response conflict by inhibiting the (incorrectly) prepared target response. Increased reactive control will 
be reflected in larger N2 and P3a amplitudes indicating increased response conflict detection and 
response conflict resolution. 
We predict that these ERP components, indexing proactive and reactive control, will be modulated 
by trait rumination. Integrating EEG in our experimental design of Experiment 2, will allow us to expose 
the temporal dynamics of neural recruitment related to different aspects of cognitive control in the 
context of rumination.  
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Forty-two participants (i.e., volunteers and undergraduate students) participated in the experiment. 
All participants were right-handed, native Dutch speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and had no history of epilepsy. Individuals taking psychoactive drugs were excluded from participating. 
Similarly, as in Experiment 1, we controlled for depressive symptomology. Participants were naive to 
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the purpose of the experiment. A general report describing the aims and the group-level results of the 
study was sent to the participants after completion of the study. Written informed consent was obtained 
from each participant after the experimental task and the EEG recording procedure had been explained 
prior to the experimental session. Undergraduate students received course credits for their participation. 
The experiment was approved by the Social and Societal Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences of the University of Leuven (reference: G-2015 02 187).  
 
Measures and material 
Self-report questionnaires  
The self-report questionnaires used in the current experiment were identical to Experiment 1.  
Experimental EEG task: AX-CPT 
The current stimuli and procedure were highly similar to the experimental task used in Experiment 
1. However, a few changes were made. Participants were seated in an electrically shielded, dimly lit 
room for the duration of the experimental EEG session. The AX-CPT was performed on a 15-inch color 
CRT monitor. Participants had to make a target response by pressing the yellow key with their left index 
finger and had to make a non-target response by pressing the blue key with their right index finger. We 
noticed that the majority of previous studies used multiple letters (e.g., Beste at al., 2011, Braver et al., 
2001, Cohen et al., 1999, Lamm et al., 2013, Lesh et al., 2013, Morales et al., 2015, van Wouwe et al., 
2011) instead of only “A”, “X”, “B” and “Y”. For consistency, “B” cues could therefore now be any 
letter of the alphabet, except “X”, “K”, and “Y” (to avoid perceptual similarity with “X”). “Y” probes 
could now be any letter of the alphabet except for “A” and “K”. All stimuli were presented in black on 
a white screen. The experiment started with 10 practice trials (50 % target and 50 % non-target trials) 
where the participants received feedback on the accuracy of their responses (i.e., the message “correct” 




EEG data recording and pre-processing 
EEG data were recorded from 64 scalp locations (BioSemi ActiveTwo System, BioSemi, 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands) with a sample rate of 2048 Hz. Eye movements were recorded with 
electrode pairs placed 1 cm above and below the eye (vertical EOG) and from the outer canthi of each 
eye (horizontal EOG). After recording, the EEG was down-sampled offline to a 512 Hz sample rate. For 
the pre-processing of the cue-locked activity, recordings were epoched from -500 ms to +2500 ms 
relative to the onset of the cue. For the pre-processing of probe-locked activity, recordings were epoched 
from -500 ms to +2000 ms relative to the onset of the probe. Baseline correction was performed on the 
200 ms prior to cue and probe onset, respectively. Artefact rejection was conducted by visual inspection. 
Artefacts not corresponding to eye blinks were manually removed. Next, independent component 
analysis (ICA) using MatLab (The Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) EEGlab toolbox. Subsequently, blink 
components and oculomotor artefacts were manually identified, based on visual inspection and were 
then removed from the EEG data. Noisy channels were replaced by an interpolated weighted average 
from surrounding electrodes using the MatLab (The Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) EEGlab toolbox 
(Delorme & Makeig, 2004). Data from five participants (cue-locked pre-processing) and seven 
participants (probe-locked pre-processing) contained noisy channels. For the cue-locked pre-processing, 
0.15 channels on average were interpolated. For the probe-locked pre-processing, 0.21 channels on 
average were interpolated. Subsequently, trials with artefacts (voltage exceeding ± 200 µV relative to 
baseline, at any electrode) were removed using extreme value rejection. Finally, segments containing 
further artefacts, identified by visual inspection, were removed prior to averaging. Before averaging 
ERPs, the signals were re-referenced to the average of all 64 electrodes. When more than 25% of the 
trials (i.e., 100 trials) of the data of a participant still contained artefacts in the EEG signal after 
correction for eye movements, the data of this participant was discarded from the ERP and behavioral 





Statistical analyses were highly similar to the analyses conducted in Experiment 1.  
For the ERP cue-locked analyses, we performed two repeated measures ANCOVAs with Cue (2 
levels: A and B) as a within-subjects factor and the centered Rumination scores as a covariate on the 
dependent variables (i.e., mean average voltage of correct trials during the P3b time-window and CNV 
time-window). For the ERP probe-locked analyses, we performed two repeated measures ANCOVAs 
with Trial Type (4 levels: AX, AY, BX, BY) as a within-subjects factor and the centered Rumination 
scores as a covariate on the dependent variables (i.e., mean average voltage of correct trials during the 
N2 time-window and P3a time-window). For the behavioral analyses, we performed two repeated 
measures ANCOVAs with Trial Type (4 levels: AX, AY, BX, BY) as a within-subjects factor and the 
centered Rumination scores as a covariate on the dependent variables (i.e., median RTs of the correct 
responses and mean error rates). 
 
ERP components and analyses 
Only the experimental trials with correct responses (on average 97 % for the cue-locked analyses and 
98 % for the probe-locked analyses) were included in the ERP analyses. To define the spatial topography 
and time-windows, we first averaged the waveforms for each Cue (i.e., A-cue and B-cue) and each Trial 
Type (i.e., AX, AY, BX, BY), respectively for the cue-locked analyses and for the probe-locked 
analyses. Based on the collapsed waveforms, we defined the spatial topography for the analysis of cue 
components based on the grand-average difference plot between B-cues and A-cues, and probe 
components based on a grand-average difference plot of response conflict (i.e., the difference between 
BY-trials and AY-trials). Based on the collapsed waveforms and on prior research studying these ERP 
components, we defined the time-windows for each component. Subsequent EEG analysis, data 
averaging and data handling were conducted using MatLab and custom-built MatLab scripts (The 




P3b. For the P3b, the EEG recording was filtered between 0.01 Hz (high-pass filter) and 30 Hz (low-
pass filter), slope 24 dB/octave. In line with the approach used in prior research using the AX-CPT 
(Morales et al., 2015; van Wouwe et al., 2011), the P3b amplitude was calculated over a time-window 
between 400 ms to 700 ms after cue presentation, corresponding to the latencies in which the grand 
averages exceeded a quarter of the P3b peak amplitudes. For this analysis, we pooled EEG activity from 
a cluster of centro-parietal electrodes (CP1, CPz, CP2, P1, Pz, P2, PO3, POz, and PO4). 
CNV. For the CNV, the EEG data was filtered between 0.01 Hz (high-pass filter) and 30 Hz (low-
pass filter), slope 24 dB/octave. We examined the CNV in a time window between 1000 ms and 2000 
ms post-cue. For this analysis, we pooled EEG activity across a region of midline electrodes (Fz, FCz, 
Cz, and CPz). 
N2. In order to avoid masking of the N2 by the larger P3a amplitudes, a 2 Hz (high-pass) and a 12 
Hz (low-pass), slope 24 dB/octave filter was applied to filter out the P3a component (Clayson & Larson, 
2011; Morales et al., 2015; van Wouwe et al., 2011). The N2 was calculated by pooling data over the 
centro-parietal electrodes FCz, Cz, CPz and Pz in the 40 ms period around the peak of the component, 
which resulted in a time-window between 240 ms and 280 ms (based on Donchin & Coles, 1988; 
Desender, Van Opstal, Hughes, & Van den Bussche, 2016, Muscarella et al., 2019). 
P3a. For the P3a, the EEG over the frontal electrode Fz was filtered at 0.01 Hz (high-pass) and 30 
Hz (low-pass), slope 24 dB/octave. The P3a was calculated over the electrode Fz in the 80 ms period 
around the peak of the component. This resulted in a time-window between 320 ms and 400 ms (based 




As explained above, making inferences regarding proactive and reactive control engagement based 
on behavioral data alone might prove difficult. However, by using EEG we can further disentangle the 
unique contribution of proactive control. More specifically, by investigating brain activity following the 
 
 24
cue, we can determine the extent to which participants maintain this information to prepare their 
upcoming response (i.e., proactive control). 
For the cue-related ERP components, we expect a decreased use of proactive control to be associated 
with trait rumination. This will be reflected in an association between smaller P3b differences between 
B-cues and A-cues (suggesting difficulties engaging with relevant cue information and updating no-
longer relevant information with novel relevant cue information) and trait rumination (Hypothesis 2.1). 
If decreased proactive control is associated with trait rumination, we also expect that trait rumination 
will vary as a function of the difference in CNV between A-cues and B-cues (i.e., increasing trait 
rumination will be related to a smaller CNV difference between A-cues and B-cues), reflecting an 
impaired use of the cue information to adequately prepare for the upcoming response (Hypothesis 2.2).  
For the probe-related ERP components, we expect that reactive control (which is reflected in larger 
N2 and P3a amplitudes) will be recruited on BX-trials and AY-trials, since cues and probes on these 
trial types activate different response categories. However, a decreased proactive control with trait 
rumination will not only be reflected in the cue-related ERP components but also in the probe-related 
components. Because of a decreased proactive control, response competition will change on BX- and 
AY-trials. Specifically, reactive control will have to be engaged to a lesser extent after Y-probes on AY-
trials. A decreased maintenance of the A-cue, will result in a smaller response conflict between the A-
cue and the Y-probe, leading to smaller N2 amplitudes (Hypothesis 2.3). In addition, the Y-probe will 
prompt for the correct non-target response. A decreased maintenance of the A-cue will require less 
inhibition of a prepotent tendency to make a target response based on this cue, which will be reflected 
in smaller P3a amplitudes (Hypothesis 2.4). Similarly, on BX-trials, a decreased maintenance of the B-
cue, will result in a smaller response conflict between the B-cue and the X-probe. However, as the X-
probe triggers an incorrect response tendency towards a target response, participants will detect a 
response conflict (as reflected by larger N2 amplitudes; Hypothesis 2.5) and will need to inhibit a 
prepotent tendency to make a target response (as reflected by larger P3a amplitudes; Hypothesis 2.6) in 
order to make a correct non-target response. In general, if increased reactive control is associated with 
trait rumination, we would expect that this will mostly be apparent in the AY-trials and BX-trials with 





Similar to Experiment 1, we again hypothesize that a shift towards more reactive control at the 
expense of proactive control might be related to trait rumination, leading to enhanced AY-performance 
(Hypothesis 2.7) and decreased BX-performance (Hypothesis 2.8). In addition, we can now also 
determine whether a decreased performance on BX-trials and an increased performance on AY-trials 
results from decreased proactive control recruitment or an increased reactive control recruitment by 
complementing the behavioral results with the ERP results. However, in line with the results of 
Experiment 1, it could also be that we do not find cognitive control dynamics to be associated with trait 




The data of three participants were removed due to excessive noise and artifacts on the EEG 
recordings. Additionally, two participants responded significantly slower (+2 SDs) than the mean and 
were therefore excluded from the analysis2. We excluded three participants based on a BDI-II-NL score 
within the clinical range. The EEG recording of one participant experienced technical problems (e.g., 
data loss of 2.75 %), so the analysis was performed on the remaining part of the data of this participant. 
Thus, the final sample consisted of 34 participants (7 men). Their mean age was 21.2 years (SD = 2.35, 
age range 18 - 25 years). The mean BDI-II-NL score was 4.91 (SD = 3.40, range 0 - 12) and the mean 









Cue locked ERPs 
P3B. Figure 3 presents the grand average cue-locked ERPs for the centro-parietal electrodes elicited 
by the different cues (i.e., A and B).  
A repeated measures ANCOVA with Cue (2 levels: A and B) as a within-subjects factor and the 
mean centered Rumination scores as a covariate on the mean average voltage of correct trials during the 
P3b time-window (400 ms - 700 ms) across centro-parietal electrodes, showed a main effect of Cue, F(1, 
32) = 115.39, p < .001, η2p = .78. The P3b amplitude was larger for B-cues (MB-cue = 4.71 μV) compared 
to that for A-cues (MA-cue = 1.53 μV). The ANCOVA showed no interaction between Cue and 
Rumination, F(1, 32) = 0.005, p = .95, η2p < 0 (Hypothesis 2.1), nor a main effect of Rumination, F(1, 
32) = 0.18, p = .68, η2p  = .006.  
 
CNV. Figure 3 presents the grand average cue-locked ERPs for the fronto-central electrodes elicited 




Figure 3. 3a. Grand averages of the cue-locked ERPs evoked at the centro-parietal electrodes (CP1, 
P1, PO3, POz, Pz, CPz, CP2, P2 and PO4). Dark gray horizontal bars indicate the P3b time-windows of 
analysis, respectively 400 ms to 700 ms. 3b. Topographic distribution plot for the P3b effect (B - A 
cues) over the 400 ms to 700 ms time-window. 3c. Grand averages of the cue-locked ERPs evoked at 
the fronto-central electrodes (Fz, FCz, Cz and CPz). The light grey bar indicates the CNV window of 
analysis (1000 ms to 2000 ms). 3d. Topographic distribution plot for the CNV effect (B - A cues) over 




A repeated measures ANCOVA with Cue (2 levels: A and B) as a within-subjects factor and the 
centered Rumination scores as a covariate on the mean average voltage of correct trials during the CNV 
time-window (1000 ms - 2000 ms) across the fronto-central electrodes showed a main effect of Cue, 
F(1, 32) = 39.27, p < .001, η2p = .55. The CNV amplitude was larger for B-cues (MB-cue = -1.83 μV) 
compared to A-cues (MA-cue = -0.48 μV). The ANCOVA did not show a main effect of Rumination, F(1, 
32) = 2.30, p = .14, η2p = .067, nor an interaction between Cue and Rumination, F(1, 32) = 0.30, p = .59, 
η2p = .009 (Hypothesis 2.2).  
 
Probe locked ERPs 
N2. Figure 4 presents the grand average probe-locked ERPs for the centro-parietal electrodes elicited 
by the different trial types (i.e., AX, AY, BX, BY).  
A repeated measures ANCOVA with Trial Type (4 levels: AX, AY, BX, BY) as a within-subjects 
factor and the centered Rumination scores as a covariate on the mean average voltage of correct trials 
during the N2 time-window (240 ms - 280 ms) across the centro-parietal electrodes showed a main effect 
of Trial Type, F(3, 30) = 73.09, pGG < .001, η2p = .70. Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-
tests indicated that the N2 amplitude for AY-trials (MAY = -2.40 μV) was larger than that for AX-trials 
(MAX = -0.28 μV, t(33) = -9.52, p < .001), BX-trials (MBX = 0.17 μV, t(33) = -11.57, p < .001) and BY-
trials (MBY = -0.15 μV, t(33) = -11.29, p < .001). Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-tests 
indicated that the N2 amplitude for BY-trials was also larger than that for BX-trials, t(33) = -2.98, p = 
.005. No difference (using a Bonferonni corrected α) was found between the N2 amplitude for AX-trials 
and BX-trials, t(33) = -2.27, p = .033 and between the N2 amplitude for AX-trials and BY-trials, t(33) 
= -0.71, p = .48. The ANCOVA did not show a main effect of Rumination, F(1, 32) = 2.88, p = .099, 
η2p = .083, nor an interaction between Trial Type and Rumination, F(3, 30) = 0.87, pGG = .44, η
2
p = 




P3a. Figure 4 presents the grand average probe-locked ERPs for the centro-parietal electrodes 
elicited by the different trial types (i.e., AX, AY, BX, BY).  
A repeated measures ANCOVA with Trial Type (4 levels: AX, AY, BX, BY) as a within-subjects 
factor and the centered Rumination scores as a covariate on the mean average voltage of correct trials 
during the P3a time-window (320 ms - 400 ms) across the frontal electrode showed a main effect of 
Trial Type, F(3, 30) = 21.01, pGG < .001,  η2p = .40. Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-
tests indicated that the P3a amplitude for AY-trials (MAY = 0.83 μV) was larger than that for AX-trials 
(MAX = -2.61 μV, t(33) = 5.39, p < .001), BX-trials (MBX = -2.88 μV, t(33) = 4.76, p < .001) and BY-
trials (MBY = -2.93 μV, t(33) = 5.62, p < .001). Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-tests did 
not show a significant difference between the P3a amplitude for AX-trials and BX-trials, t(33) = 0.69, 
p = .50, AX-trials and BY-trials, t(33) = 0.84, p = .41, and BX-trials and BY-trials, t(33) = 0.13, p = .90. 
The ANCOVA did not show a main effect of Rumination, F(1, 32) = 1.32, p = .26, η2p = .040, nor an 
interaction between Trial Type and Rumination, F(3, 30) = 1.16, pGG = .32, η2p = .035 (Hypotheses 2.4 





Figure 4. 4a. Grand averages of the probe-locked ERPs evoked over the centro-parietal electrodes 
(FCz, Cz, CPz and Pz). The grey bar indicates the N2 window of analysis (240 ms to 280 ms). 4b. 
Topographic distribution plot for the N2 effect (BY - AY trials) over the 240 ms to 280 ms time-window. 
4c. Grand averages of the probe-locked ERPs evoked at the frontal electrode (Fz). The grey bar indicates 
the P3a window of analysis (320 ms to 400 ms). 4d. Topographic distribution plot for the P3a effect 




The median RTs of correct responses and mean error rates as a function of Trial Type (i.e., AX, AY, 
BX, BY) are summarized in Figure 5. 
Reaction times 
Inaccurate responses (i.e., target trials categorized as non-target trials or vice versa; on average 3.36 
%) were discarded for the RT analyses. A repeated measures ANCOVA with Trial Type (4 levels: AX, 
AY, BX, BY) as a within-subjects factor and the centered Rumination scores as a covariate on median 
RTs of the correct responses showed a main effect of Trial Type, F(3, 30) = 211.50, pGG < .001, η2p = 
.87. Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-tests indicated that participants were slower on AY-
trials (MAY = 476 ms) compared to AX-trials (MAX = 341 ms, t(33) = 16.79, p < .001), BX-trials (MBX = 
278 ms, t(33) = 20.27, p < .001) and BY-trials (MBY = 286 ms, t(33) = 22.82, p < .001). Post-hoc 
Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-tests indicated that participants were slower on AX-trials 
compared to BX-trials, t(33) = 5.82, p < .001 and compared to BY-trials, t(33) = 4.91, p < .001. 
Moreover, post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-tests indicated no difference in RTs between 
BX-trials and BY-trials, t(33) = -1.88, p = .069. The ANCOVA did not show a main effect of 
Rumination, F(1, 32) = 3.65, p = .065, η2p = .10, nor an interaction between Trial Type and Rumination, 
F(3, 30) = 2.31, pGG = .12, η2p = .067 (Hypotheses 2.7 and 2.8).  
 
Error rates 
The same repeated measures analysis conducted on the mean error rates showed a main effect of 
Trial Type, F(3, 30) = 30.64, pGG < .001, η2p = .49. Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-
tests indicated that participants made more errors on AY-trials (MAY = 10.71 %) compared to AX-trials 
(MAX = 1.06 %, t(33) = 5.65, p < .001), BX-trials (MBX = 1.11 %, t(33) = 5.42, p < .001) and BY-trials 
(MBY = 0.55 %, t(33) = 5.98, p < .001). Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t-tests indicated 
no difference in error rates between AX-trials and BX-trials, t(33) = -0.15, p = .88, between BX-trials 
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and BY-trials, t(33) = 1.64, p = .11 and between AX-trials and BY-trials, t(33) = 1.76, p = .088. The 
ANCOVA did not indicate a main effect of Rumination, F(1, 32) = 0.14, p = .71, η2p = .004, nor an 






Figure 5. Means of the median reaction times (in ms) of the correct responses and the mean error rates (in %) as a function of Trial Type (i.e., AX, AY, BX, 




The present study is the first to investigate whether a shift towards more reactive control instead of 
proactive control is associated with increased trait rumination. Using an AX-CPT, we examined whether 
impairments in context updating and the maintenance of task-relevant information, reflecting a 
decreased proactive control, was associated with trait rumination. In contrast, we investigated whether 
enhanced response conflict detection and response inhibition, reflecting increased reactive cognitive 
control, were associated with trait rumination. The results of both experiments did not provide support 
for our hypotheses. 
Consistent with previous research using the AX-CPT (e.g., Paxton et al., 2008; Morales et al., 2015), 
we observed the expected behavioral and neurophysiological effects. More specifically, in line with 
DMC predictions (Braver et al., 2009; Edwards et al., 2010; Paxton et al., 2008), we observed that 
participants in both experiments employed a proactive control strategy (relative to a reactive control 
strategy) to solve the task. More specifically, in general, participants employed a proactive control 
strategy relative to a reactive control strategy to perform the task, given that participants’ overall 
performance was significantly worse on AY-trials compared to the other types of trials. This result 
indicates that participants relied on the cue-information to prepare a response to a subsequent probe. In 
the case of AY-trials, the preparation of a target response prompted by the A-cue, biased participants 
towards an incorrect response tendency. The use of a proactive strategy in the behavioral data was further 
supported by the results of the cue-related and probe-related ERP components. First, we found that the 
P3b was larger for B-cues compared to the P3b for A-cues, indicating that participants were attentive to 
the presentation of novel task-relevant information. Second, the CNV amplitude was also larger for B-
cues compared to A-cues, reflecting adequate response preparation processes. Third, we observed larger 
N2 and P3a amplitudes in response to AY-trials compared to the other types of trials, indicating that 
participants experienced a larger response conflict for AY-trials (increased reactive control due to a 
well-functioning proactive control; N2) and consequently showed an increased need for inhibition of an 
incorrect response tendency towards a target response triggered by A-cues (P3a). 
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Furthermore, in accordance with previous research (Beckwé et al., 2014), we observed in Experiment 
1 that given a preserved accuracy performance, trait rumination was associated with generally slower 
reaction times. According to the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), these increased reaction times, together with preserved accuracy, 
might reflect compensatory enhancement of cognitive control in order to maintain task performance. 
Unexpectedly, we did not observe that a shift towards more reactive control instead of proactive 
control was associated with trait rumination. With regards to proactive control, previous studies focusing 
on proactive mechanisms demonstrated an impaired proactive control in the context of rumination (e.g., 
Beckwé et al., 2014; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). However, we did not find an association between 
attenuated cue-related P3b (Hypothesis 2.1) and CNV components (Hypothesis 2.2) (implying impaired 
maintenance of the cue-information and diminished response preparation processes) and trait 
rumination. With regards to reactive control, previous studies focusing on reactive mechanisms 
demonstrated an enhanced reactive control in the context of rumination (Altamirano et al., 2010; Zetsche 
& Joormann, 2011). However, we did not find an association between rumination and altered probe-
related N2 (Hypotheses 2.3 and 2.5) and P3a components (Hypotheses 2.4 and 2.6) (implying altered 
response conflict detection processes and response inhibition processes). Behaviorally, we did not find 
a decreased performance on BX-trials (Hypotheses 1.2 and 2.8) nor an increased performance on AY-
trials (Hypotheses 1.1 and 2.7), associated with decreased proactive control and increased reactive 
control, to be related with trait rumination. 
It could be argued that impairments in the maintenance of task-relevant information in the context of 
trait rumination would only show up under increased WM maintenance demands, for instance with 
longer cue-probe intervals than the relatively short cue-probe intervals (i.e., 2 s) that were used in the 
current study. Specifically, under conditions where the cue-probe interval is long (e.g., 5 s or more), 
task-relevant information should not only be represented but should also be actively maintained over 
time (Braver & Barch, 2002; Braver et al., 2005). Therefore, longer cue-probe intervals require stronger 
context maintenance (Braver & Barch, 2002). Accordingly, impairments in context maintenance might 
be more apparent following longer delays. A recent study by Muscarella et al. (2019) observed that 
when using a longer cue-probe interval (i.e., 4900 ms), individuals with insomnia disorder (which were 
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characterized by increased levels of trait rumination) showed an impaired proactive control engagement 
(as reflected by the P3b and CNV components). Likewise, in previous research indicating proactive 
control impairments in the context of trait rumination (Zetsche et al., 2012) the maintenance interval 
applied in a WM Selection task (WMST) was approximately 9 s. Future studies examining proactive 
control in the context of trait rumination should therefore include longer cue-probe intervals to create a 
task context where a sufficient amount of proactive control has to be exerted for optimal task 
performance. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that the involvement of proactive and reactive control is context-
dependent, favoring one cognitive control strategy over the other depending on whether conflict events 
occur with low or high frequency (Aben et al., 2019; Jaspar, Manard, Dideberg, Bours, Maquet, & 
Collette, 2016). For example, using a Stroop task, it has been shown that in a context containing mainly 
congruent trials, participants shift towards more reactive control, exerting control in a just-in-time 
manner. In contrast, in a mainly incongruent context, participants shift towards more proactive control, 
exerting control to prevent conflict before its occurrence (Braver et al., 2005). In our current design, we 
only created a mainly congruent context, where the majority (i.e., 80 %) of the trials consisted of 
congruent trials (i.e., AX-trials and BY-trials; where cue and probe activate the same response category) 
and the minority (i.e., 20 %) of trials of incongruent trials (i.e., AY-trials and BX-trials; where cue and 
probe activate opposite response categories). In this task context, reactive control is triggered on 
incongruent trials. Our results demonstrate that specifically on AY-trials, increased reactive control (as 
reflected by larger N2 and P3a amplitudes) was recruited. However, this shift towards reactive control 
was not associated with trait rumination. To examine the reactive-proactive control balance in the 
context of trait rumination more elaborately, future studies should also include a mostly incongruent 
context, which triggers proactive control.  
Furthermore, it could also be argued that our version of the AX-CPT may not have been challenging 
enough to observe impairments in proactive control associated with trait rumination. Indeed, differences 
in task difficulty between our task and tasks used in previous studies observing proactive impairments 
might account for the failure to find clear impairments in proactive control associated with trait 
rumination in our study. In previous research observing proactive control impairments in the context of 
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rumination (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Yoon, et al., 2014; Zetsche et al., 2012), participants had to 
memorize a set of six items during a learning phase, and were subsequently instructed to forget three of 
the six items of that list. Finally, a probe item appeared, and participants had to indicate whether the 
probe item belonged to the final list or not. In this task, participants not only need to maintain task-
relevant information in WM, but they also need to update this information in WM when this information 
is no longer relevant for the present context. Specifically, participants need to update information within 
the current trial. In contrast, in our design, participants need to update information across different trials. 
A manipulation within the same trial might be more challenging and might subsequently recruit more 
proactive control processes. Future studies examining proactive control in the context of trait rumination 
should therefore include a challenging task context where task-relevant information needs to be 
maintained and updated within the same context.  
There are some limitations to this study that should be addressed in future research. First, using this 
AX-CPT, it remains difficult to objectively disentangle reactive control from proactive control 
engagement. Specifically, making behavioral and electrophysiological inferences regarding proactive 
control engagement based on post-probe data remains difficult since reactive processes also come into 
play once the probe is presented (and vice versa). For instance, according to the DMC account, enhanced 
performance on AY-trials should be associated with an increased mobilization of reactive control in 
order to inhibit incorrect response tendencies associated with the A-cue. However, an enhanced 
performance on AY-trials could also result from a decreased utilization of proactive control 
mechanisms, resulting in a decreased response bias towards a target response and hence a decreased 
need for reactive mechanisms to resolve the competition at the response level (as also reflected by 
smaller N2 and P3a amplitudes). Similarly, a decreased performance on BX-trials, which the DMC 
account associated with reactive control mechanisms, could also be related to a decreased proactive 
control. More precisely, when the B-cue is not proactively maintained, it will activate a non-target 
response to a lesser extent. Consequently, when the X-probe is presented reactive control is not needed 
as much, as less response conflict is experienced. Thus, the X-probe will activate an erroneous target-
response, resulting in decreased performance on BX-trials. Future studies using this task should be aware 
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that while this task is able to examine the proactive-reactive control balance, it is less suited to 
completely disentangle proactive from reactive control. 
Second, a shifted proactive-reactive control balance associated with trait rumination may be apparent 
only in individuals with higher levels of trait rumination. In our study, we used a sample of 
undergraduate students and volunteers and we controlled for clinical levels of depressive symptoms by 
excluding participants with elevated BDI-scores. To increase generalizability, we included individuals 
with a broad range of trait rumination scores (i.e., low, moderate and high levels of trait rumination). 
However, in previous studies investigating cognitive control in a sample of participants with a tendency 
to ruminate, the levels of trait rumination were higher compared to the ones in our sample (e.g., Beckwé 
et al., 2014; Hoorelbeke et al., 2015). For example, in a study of Beckwé et al. (2014), high ruminators 
were characterized by an RRS score > 56 and the mean RRS score in this group was 65. In a study of 
Hoorelbeke and colleagues (2015) increased levels of rumination were defined as an RRS score ≥ 43 
and the mean RRS scores in both groups were > 51. In our study, the mean RRS scores were 49 (range: 
28 - 74) and 41 (range: 26 - 69), respectively for Experiments 1 and 2. Furthermore, previous studies 
composed their samples by only selecting participants with increased levels of trait rumination (RRS 
score ≥ 43), which might also affect generalizability. Possibly, our results may underestimate the 
association between cognitive control and trait rumination, since we did not include those individuals 
with more elevated levels of trait rumination. Future studies should increase the range of trait rumination 
levels by including participants with lower as well as higher levels of trait rumination, which might 
improve the generalizability and reliability.  
Third, the association between cognitive control and trait rumination might only be present in 
valenced situations. Previous studies investigating the link between proactive control and trait 
rumination (e.g., De Lissnyder et al., 2012; Zetsche et al., 2012) showed that proactive impairments in 
cognitive control in the context of rumination were mostly pronounced during the processing of negative 
information. For example, Zetsche et al. (2012) showed that a reduced ability to regulate and control 
negative material in WM predicted higher levels of trait rumination. Future studies should include tasks 
assessing proactive and reactive control using emotional (negative) stimulus material to investigate 
whether valence-specific control deficits are associated with trait rumination. Notably, due to the 
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correlational nature of this study, we cannot draw any causal conclusions regarding the relationship 
between cognitive control and trait rumination. Further research should clarify the direction of the 
relationship between both constructs.  
Fourth, the samples in our experiments were heavily skewed toward women and this could 
potentially bias the results. Future studies need to use more balanced samples. Fifth, in our study, we 
did not control for other psychopathologies related to rumination, except for depressive 
symptomatology. As we did not control for other psychopathology related to rumination, we were not 
able to measure the singular effect of cognitive control on trait rumination, without the interference of 
co-morbid mental disorders. Future studies should control for the mental health status of participants for 
example by means of a structural clinical interview assessing other possible co-morbid clinical disorders.  
In conclusion, we investigated whether a shift towards more reactive control instead of proactive 
control, was associated with increased trait rumination using behavioral and electrophysiological 
measures. However, we found no evidence of such a disturbed proactive-reactive control balance to be 
associated with trait rumination. More research is needed to further investigate the proactive-reactive 
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